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Chief Causes of Error and Difficulty in the Sciences, 
with the Grounds of Scepticism, Atheism, and 
Irreligion, are inquired into.
MY LORD,
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You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to 
be known to your lordship, should presume to address you in this manner. 
But that a man who has written something with a design to promote Useful 
Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship 
for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not altogether 
unacquainted with the present state of the church and learning, and 
consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to both. 
Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present of my poor 
endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness 
which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I might add, my lord, 
that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to show 
towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to 
countenance the studies of one of its members. These considerations 
determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet, and the rather 
because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and most 
profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the world so 
justly admires in your lordship, 
MY LORD, 
Your lordship's most humble and most devoted servant, 
GEORGE BERKELEY
PREFACE
 WHAT I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed 
to me evidently true and not unuseful to be known- particularly to those who 
are tainted with Scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence and 
immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether it be 
so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine; since I do not 
think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I have written 
than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this may not suffer, I make it 
my request that the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read 
the whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the 
subject-matter shall seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages that, 
taken by themselves, are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross 
misinterpretation, and to be charged with most absurd consequences, which, 
nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them; so 
likewise, though the whole should be read over, yet, if this be done 
transiently, it is very probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking 
reader, I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the 
characters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions 
may seem to bear, it is, I hope, needless to make any apology on that 
account. He must surely be either very weak, or very little acquainted with 
the sciences, who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration, for no 
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other reason but because it is newly known, and contrary to the prejudices of 
mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if possible, 
the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion 
before they rightly comprehend it. 
 INTRODUCTION
 1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may 
with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it 
should enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater clearness and 
evidence of knowledge, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties 
than other men. Yet so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk 
the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of 
nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is 
familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain 
not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are out of all danger of 
becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to 
follow the light of a superior principle, to reason, meditate, and reflect on 
the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our minds 
concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. 
Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts discover themselves to our 
view; and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn 
into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and 
grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered 
through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, 
which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism. 
2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things, or the natural 
weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the faculties we 
have are few, and those designed by nature for the support and comfort of 
life, and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things. 
Besides, the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which partake 
of infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into absurdities and 
contradictions, out of which it is impossible it should ever extricate itself, it 
being of the nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which is 
finite. 
3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault 
originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. 
It is a hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true principles should 
ever end in consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent. 
We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men 
than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed 
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quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wonted indulgent 
methods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may have implanted in 
the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made 
use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think 
that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto 
amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely 
owing to ourselves- that we have first raised a dust and then complain we 
cannot see. 
4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are 
which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those 
absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy; 
insomuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, 
conceiving it to arise from the natural dulness and limitation of our faculties. 
And surely it is a work well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry 
concerning the First Principles of Human Knowledge, to sift and examine 
them on all sides, especially since there may be some grounds to suspect 
that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass the mind in its 
search after truth, do not spring from any darkness and intricacy in the 
objects, or natural defect in the understanding, so much as from false 
Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been avoided. 
5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I 
consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the 
like designs, yet I am not without some hopes- upon the consideration that 
the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-
sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a 
close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes. 
6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what 
follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction, 
concerning the nature and abuse of Language. But the unravelling this 
matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice 
of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and 
perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in 
almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion that the mind hath a 
power of framing abstract ideas or notions of things. He who is not a perfect 
stranger to the writings and disputes of philosophers must needs 
acknowledge that no small part of them are spent about abstract ideas. These 
are in a more especial manner thought to be the object of those sciences 
which go by the name of Logic and Metaphysics, and of all that which 
passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sublime learning, in all 
which one shall scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does 
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not suppose their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted with 
them. 
7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do never 
really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated from all others, but 
are mixed, as it were, and blended together, several in the same object. But, 
we are told, the mind being able to consider each quality singly, or 
abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united, does by that 
means frame to itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived by sight 
an object extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound idea the 
mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, 
exclusive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, colour, and 
motion. Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without 
extension; but only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea 
of colour exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusive of both colour and 
extension. 
8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular extensions 
perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all, and some 
other things peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which distinguish 
them one from another; it considers apart or singles out by itself that which 
is common, making thereof a most abstract idea of extension, which is 
neither line, surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but is an 
idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind, by leaving out 
of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them 
one from another, and retaining that only which is common to all, makes an 
idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, nor blue, nor white, nor any 
other determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering motion 
abstractedly not only from the body moved, but likewise from the figure it 
describes, and all particular directions and velocities, the abstract idea of 
motion is framed; which equally corresponds to all particular motions 
whatsoever that may be perceived by sense. 
9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes, so 
does it, by the same precision or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of 
the more compounded beings which include several coexistent qualities. For 
example, the mind having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble 
each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, 
leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, James, and 
any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining only what 
is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars 
equally partake- abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those 
circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular 
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existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of 
man, or, if you please, humanity, or human nature; wherein it is true there is 
included colour, because there is no man but has some colour, but then it 
can be neither white, nor black, nor any particular colour, because there is 
no one particular colour wherein all men partake. So likewise there is 
included stature, but then it is neither tall stature, nor low stature, nor yet 
middle stature, but something abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. 
Moreover, their being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some 
parts, but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out those 
parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only which are common 
to all the living creatures, frames the idea of animal, which abstracts not 
only from all particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. 
The constituent parts of the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and 
spontaneous motion. By body is meant body without any particular shape or 
figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all animals, without 
covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, &c., nor yet naked: hair, 
feathers, scales, and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of 
particular animals, and for that reason left out of the abstract idea. Upon the 
same account the spontaneous motion must be neither walking, nor flying, 
nor creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is not 
easy to conceive. 
10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, 
they best can tell: for myself, I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or 
representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, 
and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with 
two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can 
consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated 
from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must 
have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I 
frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black, or a tawny, a straight, 
or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort 
of thought conceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally 
impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body 
moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and 
the like may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. To be 
plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, as when I consider some 
particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they 
are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without 
them. But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive 
separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated; 
or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting from particulars in the 
manner aforesaid- which last are the two proper acceptations of abstraction. 
And there are grounds to think most men will acknowledge themselves to be 
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in my case. The generality of men which are simple and illiterate never 
pretend to abstract notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained 
without pains and study; we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such 
there be, they are confined only to the learned. 
11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of 
abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that inclines the men of 
speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as that 
seems to be. There has been a late deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no 
doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think the having 
abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of 
understanding betwixt man and beast. "The having of general ideas," saith 
he, "is that which puts a perfect distinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an 
excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For, it 
is evident we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs 
for universal ideas; from which we have reason to imagine that they have 
not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no 
use of words or any other general signs." And a little after: "Therefore, I 
think, we may suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are 
discriminated from men, and it is that proper difference wherein they are 
wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide a distance. For, if they 
have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as some would have them), 
we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that 
they do, some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense; 
but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. 
They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not 
(as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction."- Essay 
on Human Understanding, II. xi. 10 and 11. I readily agree with this learned 
author, that the faculties of brutes can by no means attain to abstraction. But 
then if this be made the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear 
a great many of those that pass for men must be reckoned into their number. 
The reason that is here assigned why we have no grounds to think brutes 
have abstract general ideas is, that we observe in them no use of words or 
any other general signs; which is built on this supposition- that the making 
use of words implies the having general ideas. From which it follows that 
men who use language are able to abstract or generalize their ideas. That 
this is the sense and arguing of the author will further appear by his 
answering the question he in another place puts: "Since all things that exist 
are only particulars, how come we by general terms?" His answer is: 
"Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas."- Essay 
on Human Understanding, IV. iii. 6. But it seems that a word becomes 
general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of 
several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the 
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mind. For example, when it is said "the change of motion is proportional to 
the impressed force," or that "whatever has extension is divisible," these 
propositions are to be understood of motion and extension in general; and 
nevertheless it will not follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of 
motion without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity, or 
that I must conceive an abstract general idea of extension, which is neither 
line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of 
any other determinate colour. It is only implied that whatever particular 
motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or 
oblique, or in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true. 
As does the other of every particular extension, it matters not whether line, 
surface, or solid, whether of this or that magnitude or figure. 
12. By observing how ideas become general we may the better judge how 
words are made so. And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely 
there are general ideas, but only that there are any abstract general ideas; for, 
in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention of general ideas, it 
is always supposed that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner set 
forth in sections 8 and 9. Now, if we will annex a meaning to our words, and 
speak only of what we can conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge that an 
idea which, considered in itself, is particular, becomes general by being 
made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. To 
make this plain by an example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the 
method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for instance, a black 
line of an inch in length: this, which in itself is a particular line, is 
nevertheless with regard to its signification general, since, as it is there used, 
it represents all particular lines whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of 
it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general. And, as 
that particular line becomes general by being made a sign, so the name 
"line," which taken absolutely is particular, by being a sign is made general. 
And as the former owes its generality not to its being the sign of an abstract 
or general line, but of all particular right lines that may possibly exist, so the 
latter must be thought to derive its generality from the same cause, namely, 
the various particular lines which it indifferently denotes. 
13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas, and 
the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of 
the Essay on Human Understanding, (IV. vii. 9) which is as follows: 
"Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised 
mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it is only because by 
constant and familiar use they are made so. For, when we nicely reflect upon 
them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the 
mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/berkeley.html (8 of 72)3/14/2005 1:26:42 AM
George Berkeley A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and 
skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most 
abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor 
rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of 
these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea 
wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are put 
together. It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, 
and makes all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of 
communication and enlargement of knowledge, to both which it is naturally 
very much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks 
of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show that the most abstract 
and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily 
acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about."- If 
any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as 
is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I 
go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform 
himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no 
hard task for anyone to perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a 
little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to 
have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of 
the general idea of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rectangle, 
equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once?" 
14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them, 
and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all hands 
agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, to emancipate 
our thoughts from particular objects, and raise them to those sublime 
speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the 
natural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the 
forming abstract ideas was not necessary for communication, which is so 
easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told, if they seem obvious 
and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they 
are made so. Now, I would fain know at what time it is men are employed in 
surmounting that difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary 
helps for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up, for then it seems 
they are not conscious of any such painstaking; it remains therefore to be the 
business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of 
framing abstract notions will be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it 
not a hard thing to imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of 
their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have 
first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their 
minds abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every common name they 
make use of? 
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15. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for the enlargement of 
knowledge than for communication. It is, I know, a point much insisted on, 
that all knowledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to which I 
fully agree: but then it doth not appear to me that those notions are formed 
by abstraction in the manner premised- universality, so far as I can 
comprehend, not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of 
anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or 
represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, 
being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal. Thus, when I 
demonstrate any proposition concerning triangles, it is to be supposed that I 
have in view the universal idea of a triangle; which ought not to be 
understood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which was neither 
equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural; but only that the particular triangle 
I consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for 
and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is in that sense 
universal. All which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it. 
16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any proposition to be 
true of all particular triangles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of 
the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all? For, because a 
property may be demonstrated to agree to some one particular triangle, it 
will not thence follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in 
all respects is not the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that 
the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right 
ones, I cannot therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other triangles 
which have neither a right angle nor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, 
to be certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make a 
particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is impossible, 
or once for all demonstrate it of the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all 
the particulars do indifferently partake and by which they are all equally 
represented. To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst I 
make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular 
triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be 
certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness 
soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor 
determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. It 
is true the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars, but then 
there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It 
is not said the three angles are equal to two right ones, because one of them 
is a right angle, or because the sides comprehending it are of the same 
length. Which sufficiently shows that the right angle might have been 
oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration have held 
good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any 
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obliquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right-
angled equicrural triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of 
the abstract idea of a triangle And here it must be acknowledged that a man 
may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the 
particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may 
abstract; but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, 
inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may consider Peter so far 
forth as man, or so far forth as animal without framing the fore-mentioned 
abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inasmuch as all that is perceived is 
not considered. 
17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace the Schoolmen, 
those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable 
labyrinths of error and dispute which their doctrine of abstract natures and 
notions seems to have led them into. What bickerings and controversies, and 
what a learned dust have been raised about those matters, and what mighty 
advantage has been from thence derived to mankind, are things at this day 
too clearly known to need being insisted on. And it had been well if the ill 
effects of that doctrine were confined to those only who make the most 
avowed profession of it. When men consider the great pains, industry, and 
parts that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation and 
advancement of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this the far greater 
part of them remains full of darkness and uncertainty, and disputes that are 
like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by 
the most clear and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which 
are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men, and that, taking all 
together, a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to 
mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement- I 
say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency and 
perfect contempt of all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the 
false principles that have obtained in the world, amongst all which there is 
none, methinks, hath a more wide and extended sway over the thoughts of 
speculative men than this of abstract general ideas. 
18. I come now to consider the source of this prevailing notion, and that 
seems to me to be language. And surely nothing of less extent than reason 
itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received. The 
truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain confession 
of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made 
in order to naming; from which it is a clear consequence that if there had 
been no such things as speech or universal signs there never had been any 
thought of abstraction. See III. vi. 39, and elsewhere of the Essay on Human 
Understanding. Let us examine the manner wherein words have contributed 
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to the origin of that mistake.- First then, it is thought that every name has, or 
ought to have, one only precise and settled signification, which inclines men 
to think there are certain abstract, determinate ideas that constitute the true 
and only immediate signification of each general name; and that it is by the 
mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any 
particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such thing as one precise and 
definite signification annexed to any general name, they all signifying 
indifferently a great number of particular ideas. All which doth evidently 
follow from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to anyone 
by a little reflexion. To this it will be objected that every name that has a 
definition is thereby restrained to one certain signification. For example, a 
triangle is defined to be "a plain surface comprehended by three right lines," 
by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To 
which I answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the surface be 
great or small, black or white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal 
or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to each other; in all which 
there may be great variety, and consequently there is no one settled idea 
which limits the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep 
a name constantly to the same definition, and another to make it stand 
everywhere for the same idea; the one is necessary, the other useless and 
impracticable. 
19. But, to give a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine 
of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion that 
language has no other end but the communicating our ideas, and that every 
significant name stands for an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain 
that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always 
mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they 
stand for abstract notions. That there are many names in use amongst 
speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate, 
particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is what nobody will deny. And a 
little attention will discover that it is not necessary (even in the strictest 
reasonings) significant names which stand for ideas should, every time they 
are used, excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for- in 
reading and discoursing, names being for the most part used as letters are in 
Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be marked by each letter, yet 
to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to 
your thoughts that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for. 
20. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief 
and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other ends, 
as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an action, 
the putting the mind in some particular disposition- to which the former is in 
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many cases barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these 
can be obtained without it, as I think does not unfrequently happen in the 
familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to reflect with himself, and see 
if it doth not often happen, either in hearing or reading a discourse, that the 
passions of fear, love, hatred, admiration, disdain, and the like, arise 
immediately in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any 
ideas coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have occasioned 
ideas that were fitting to produce those emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will 
be found that, when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of the 
sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediately attended with those 
passions which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of ideas 
that are now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be affected with the 
promise of a good thing, though we have not an idea of what it is? Or is not 
the being threatened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we 
think not of any particular evil likely to befal us, nor yet frame to ourselves 
an idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little reflexion of 
his own to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him 
that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the 
speaker's designing them for marks of ideas in his own, which he would 
have them raise in the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves do 
not seem always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of 
those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, 
when a schoolman tells me "Aristotle hath said it," all I conceive he means 
by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinion with the deference and 
submission which custom has annexed to that name. And this effect is often 
so instantly produced in the minds of those who are accustomed to resign 
their judgment to authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea 
either of his person, writings, or reputation should go before. Innumerable 
examples of this kind may be given, but why should I insist on those things 
which every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto him? 
21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. We have 
considered what has been said for them by their ablest patrons; and 
endeavored to show they are of no use for those ends to which they are 
thought necessary. And lastly, we have traced them to the source from 
whence they flow, which appears evidently to be language.- It cannot be 
denied that words are of excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of 
knowledge which has been purchased by the joint labours of inquisitive men 
in all ages and nations may be drawn into the view and made the possession 
of one single person. But at the same time it must be owned that most parts 
of knowledge have been strangely perplexed and darkened by the abuse of 
words, and general ways of speech wherein they are delivered. Since 
therefore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, whatever ideas I 
consider, I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view, 
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keeping out of my thoughts so far as I am able, those names which long and 
constant use hath so strictly united with them; from which I may expect to 
derive the following advantages: 
22. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely verbal- the 
springing up of which weeds in almost all the sciences has been a main 
hindrance to the growth of true and sound knowledge. Secondly, this seems 
to be a sure way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net of abstract 
ideas which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men; 
and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much the finer and 
more curious was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he likely 
to be ensnared and faster held therein. Thirdly, so long as I confine my 
thoughts to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I can easily be 
mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be 
deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for 
me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly 
so. To discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, 
to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is 
nothing more requisite than an attentive perception of what passes in my 
own understanding. 
23. But the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose an entire 
deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly promise 
myself; so difficult a thing it is to dissolve an union so early begun, and 
confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which 
difficulty seems to have been very much increased by the doctrine of 
abstraction. For, so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their 
words, it doth not seem strange that they should use words for ideas- it being 
found an impracticable thing to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract 
idea in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to 
me the principal cause why those men who have so emphatically 
recommended to others the laying aside all use of words in their 
meditations, and contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it 
themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions 
and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words. And, in 
order to remedy these evils, they advise well, that we attend to the ideas 
signified, and draw off our attention from the words which signify them. 
But, how good soever this advice may be they have given others, it is plain 
they could not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought 
the only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the 
immediate signification of every general name was a determinate abstract 
idea. 
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24. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease 
prevent his being imposed on by words. He that knows he has no other than 
particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the 
abstract idea annexed to any name. And he that knows names do not always 
stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there 
are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished that everyone would use 
his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, 
separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which so 
much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do 
we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth, in 
vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps 
of antiquity- we need only draw the curtain of words, to hold the fairest tree 
of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand. 
25. Unless we take care to clear the First Principles of Knowledge from the 
embarras and delusion of words, we may make infinite reasonings upon 
them to no purpose; we may draw consequences from consequences, and be 
never the wiser. The farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more 
irrecoverably, and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. 
Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to 
make my words the occasion of his own thinking, and endeavour to attain 
the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this 
means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. 
He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words, and I do not see 
how he can be led into an error by considering his own naked, undisguised 
ideas. 
 A TREATISE 
CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
1. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of human 
knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses; or 
else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the 
mind; or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination- either 
compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in 
the aforesaid ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours, with their 
several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft, heat and 
cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less either as to 
quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours; the palate with 
tastes; and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone 
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and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each 
other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one 
thing. Thus, for example a certain colour, taste, smell, figure and 
consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct 
thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of ideas constitute a 
stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things- which as they are pleasing 
or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 
2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge, 
there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises 
divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering, about them. This 
perceiving, active being is what I call mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which 
words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from 
them, wherein, they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are 
perceived- for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived. 
3. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the 
imagination, exist without the mind, is what everybody will allow. And it 
seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the 
sense, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they 
compose), cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.- I think an 
intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall attend to 
what is meant by the term exists, when applied to sensible things. The table 
I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study 
I should say it existed- meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might 
perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an 
odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it was heard; a colour 
or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can 
understand by these and the like expressions. For as to what is said of the 
absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being 
perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percepi, nor is it 
possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things 
which perceive them. 
4. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, 
mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, 
natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. 
But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle 
may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it 
in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest 
contradiction. For, what are the fore-mentioned objects but the things we 
perceive by sense? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or 
sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any 
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combination of them, should exist unperceived? 
5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will, perhaps, be found at bottom to 
depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of 
abstraction than to distinguish the existence of sensible objects from their 
being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and 
colours, heat and cold, extension and figures- in a word the things we see 
and feel- what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or 
impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate, even in thought, any 
of these from perception? For my part, I might as easily divide a thing from 
itself. I may, indeed, divide in my thoughts, or conceive apart from each 
other, those things which, perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. 
Thus, I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive 
the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I will not deny, 
I can abstract- if that may properly be called abstraction which extends only 
to the conceiving separately such objects as it is possible may really exist or 
be actually perceived asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does 
not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence, as 
it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of 
that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible 
thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. 
6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need 
only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz., 
that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word all those 
bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any 
subsistence without a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known; 
that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not 
exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no 
existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit- it being 
perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the absurdity of abstraction, to 
attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit. To 
be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in 
his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived. 
7. From what has been said it follows there is not any other Substance than 
Spirit, or that which perceives. But, for the fuller proof of this point, let it be 
considered the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., 
i.e. the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an 
unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction, for to have an idea is all one 
as to perceive; that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities 
exist must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking 
substance or substratum of those ideas. 
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8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, 
yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, 
which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance. I answer, an 
idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure can be like nothing 
but another colour or figure. If we look but never so little into our thoughts, 
we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between 
our ideas. Again, I ask whether those supposed originals or external things, 
of which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be themselves 
perceivable or no? If they are, then they are ideas and we have gained our 
point; but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to 
assert a colour is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like 
something which is intangible; and so of the rest. 
9. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary 
qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or 
impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible 
qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these 
they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without 
the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary 
qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in 
an unthinking substance which they call Matter. By Matter, therefore, we 
are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, 
and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already 
shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the 
mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that 
consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving 
substance. Hence, it is plain that that the very notion of what is called Matter 
or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it. 
10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of the primary or 
original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances, do at 
the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat cold, and suchlike 
secondary qualities, do not- which they tell us are sensations existing in the 
mind alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture, 
and motion of the minute particles of matter. This they take for an 
undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate beyond all exception. Now, if 
it be certain that those original qualities are inseparably united with the other 
sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from 
them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one 
to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the 
extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my 
own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a 
body extended and moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other 
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sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, 
extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are 
inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must 
these be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else. 
11. Again, great and small, swift and slow, are allowed to exist nowhere 
without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the frame or 
position of the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists 
without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither swift nor 
slow, that is, they are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extension in 
general, and motion in general: thus we see how much the tenet of extended 
movable substances existing without the mind depends on the strange 
doctrine of abstract ideas. And here I cannot but remark how nearly the 
vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal substance, which 
the modern philosophers are run into by their own principles, resembles that 
antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of materia prima, to be met with in 
Aristotle and his followers. Without extension solidity cannot be conceived; 
since therefore it has been shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking 
substance, the same must also be true of solidity. 
12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other 
qualities be allowed to exist without, will be evident to whoever considers 
that the same thing bears a different denomination of number as the mind 
views it with different respects. Thus, the same extension is one, or three, or 
thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, a foot, 
or an inch. Number is so visibly relative, and dependent on men's 
understanding, that it is strange to think how any one should give it an 
absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, 
etc.; all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. 
And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular 
combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind. 
13. Unity I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea, 
accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea 
answering the word unity I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not 
miss finding it: on the contrary, it should be the most familiar to my 
understanding, since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be 
perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflexion. To say no more, it is an 
abstract idea. 
14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern philosophers 
prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter, or without 
the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/berkeley.html (19 of 72)3/14/2005 1:26:42 AM
George Berkeley A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are 
affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in 
the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body which 
appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now, why may we not as 
well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of 
qualities existing in Matter, because to the same eye at different stations, or 
eyes of a different texture at the same station, they appear various, and 
cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate without 
the mind? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, 
because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter, 
as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to 
say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in 
the mind become swifter, the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear 
slower without any alteration in any external object? 
15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought 
manifestly to prove that colours and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall 
find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of 
extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of 
arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an 
outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension 
or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be 
impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality 
whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, or in 
truth, that there should be any such thing as an outward object. 
16. But let us examine a little the received opinion.- It is said extension is a 
mode or accident of Matter, and that Matter is the substratum that supports 
it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's 
supporting extension. Say you, I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot 
explain it. I answer, though you have no positive, yet, if you have any 
meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you 
know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears 
to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident 
"support" cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense- as when we say 
that pillars support a building; in what sense therefore must it be taken? 
17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare 
themselves to mean by material substance, we shall find them acknowledge 
they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being 
in general, together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The 
general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and 
incomprehensible of all other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we 
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have just now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of those 
words; it must therefore be taken in some other sense, but what that is they 
do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches which 
make the signification of the words material substance, I am convinced there 
is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble 
ourselves any farther, in discussing this material substratum or support of 
figure and motion, and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they 
have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy, 
and altogether inconceivable? 
18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, movable substances may 
exist without the mind, corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet 
how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by 
reason. As for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our 
sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived by sense, 
call them what you will: but they do not inform us that things exist without 
the mind, or unperceived, like to those which are perceived. This the 
materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have 
any knowledge at all of external things, it must be by reason, inferring their 
existence from what is immediately perceived by sense. But what reason can 
induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind, from what we 
perceive, since the very patrons of Matter themselves do not pretend there is 
any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on 
all hands (and what happens in dreams, phrensies, and the like, puts it 
beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we 
have now, though there were no bodies existing without resembling them. 
Hence, it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for 
the producing our ideas; since it is granted they are produced sometimes, 
and might possibly be produced always in the same order, we see them in at 
present, without their concurrence. 
19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them, yet 
perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their 
production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than 
otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as 
bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; for, 
though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own 
confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since 
they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act 
upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. 
Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be 
no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, since that 
is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this 
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supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the 
mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since 
it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable 
beings that are entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose. 
20. In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever 
come to know it; and if there were not, we might have the very same reasons 
to think there were that we have now. Suppose- what no one can deny 
possible- an intelligence without the help of external bodies, to be affected 
with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same 
order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence 
hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances, 
represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind, that you can 
possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can be no question- 
which one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person 
suspect the strength of whatever arguments be may think himself to have, 
for the existence of bodies without the mind. 
21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of 
Matter after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors and 
difficulties (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that tenet. It 
has occasioned numberless controversies and disputes in philosophy, and 
not a few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the 
detail of them in this place, as well because I think arguments a posteriori 
are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently 
demonstrated a priori, as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak 
somewhat of them. 
22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly prolix in 
handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate on that which may 
be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one that is 
capable of the least reflexion? It is but looking into your own thoughts, and 
so trying whether you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or 
motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial 
may perhaps make you see that what you contend for is a downright 
contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue:- 
If you can but conceive it possible for one extended movable substance, or, 
in general, for any one idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than 
in a mind perceiving it, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for all that 
compages of external bodies you contend for, I shall grant you its existence, 
though you cannot either give me any reason why you believe it exists, or 
assign any use to it when it is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of 
your opinions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so. 
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23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, 
for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to 
perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is 
all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which 
you call books and trees, and the same time omitting to frame the idea of 
any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself perceive or think 
of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose; it only shews 
you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it does 
not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may 
exist without the mind. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive 
them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. 
When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are 
all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no 
notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and does conceive bodies existing 
unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are 
apprehended by or exist in itself. A little attention will discover to any one 
the truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist 
on any other proofs against the existence of material substance. 
24. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our thoughts, to know 
whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the absolute 
existence of sensible objects in themselves, or without the mind. To me it is 
evident those words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing at 
all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way than to 
entreat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts; and if by this 
attention the emptiness or repugnancy of those expressions does appear, 
surely nothing more is requisite for the conviction. It is on this therefore that 
I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence of unthinking things are words 
without a meaning, or which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat 
and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the 
reader. 
25. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by 
whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive- there is 
nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of 
thought cannot produce or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied of 
the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our 
ideas. For, since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it 
follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived: but whoever 
shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive in 
them any power or activity; there is, therefore, no such thing contained in 
them. A little attention will discover to us that the very being of an idea 
implies passiveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impossible for an 
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idea to do anything, or, strictly speaking, to be the cause of anything: neither 
can it be the resemblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident from 
sect. 8. Whence it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot 
be the cause of our sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effects of 
powers resulting from the configuration, number, motion, and size of 
corpuscles, must certainly be false. 
26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, 
others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of 
these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. 
That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is 
clear from the preceding section. I must therefore be a substance; but it has 
been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains 
therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit. 
27. A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being- as it perceives ideas it is 
called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about 
them it is called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed of a soul or 
spirit; for all ideas whatever, being passive and inert (vide sect. 25), they 
cannot represent unto us, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A 
little attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an idea which shall 
be like that active principle of motion and change of ideas is absolutely 
impossible. Such is the nature of spirit, or that which acts, that it cannot be 
of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. If any man 
shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try 
if he can frame the idea of any power or active being, and whether he has 
ideas of two principal powers, marked by the names will and understanding, 
distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in 
general, with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the 
aforesaid powers- which is signified by the name soul or spirit. This is what 
some hold; but, so far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, do not stand 
for different ideas, or, in truth, for any idea at all, but for something which is 
very different from ideas, and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or 
represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must be owned at the same 
time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the 
mind: such as willing, loving, hating- inasmuch as we know or understand 
the meaning of these words. 
28. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure, and vary and shift the 
scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or 
that idea arises in my fancy; and by the same power it is obliterated and 
makes way for another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very 
properly denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded on 
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experience; but when we think of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas 
exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves with words. 
29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas 
actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in 
broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I 
shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present 
themselves to my view; and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; 
the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore 
some other Will or Spirit that produces them. 
30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct than those of the 
imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are 
not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often 
are, but in a regular train or series, the admirable connexion whereof 
sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set 
rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us 
the ideas of sense, are called the laws of nature; and these we learn by 
experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such 
and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things. 
31. This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our actions 
for the benefit of life. And without this we should be eternally at a loss; we 
could not know how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure, 
or remove the least pain of sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and 
fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap in the harvest; 
and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are 
conducive- all this we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion 
between our ideas, but only by the observation of the settled laws of nature, 
without which we should be all in uncertainty and confusion, and a grown 
man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an 
infant just born. 
32. And yet this consistent uniform working, which so evidently displays the 
goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the 
laws of nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather 
sends them wandering after second causes. For, when we perceive certain 
ideas of Sense constantly followed by other ideas and we know this is not of 
our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency to the ideas 
themselves, and make one the cause of another, than which nothing can be 
more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that 
when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same 
time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence 
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conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the 
motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to 
think the latter the effect of the former. 
33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called real 
things; and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and 
constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they 
copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and 
distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are 
perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense 
are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, 
and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they 
exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or 
thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will 
of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are ideas, and certainly no 
idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving 
it. 
34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in 
answering objections which may probably be made against the principles we 
have hitherto laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to those of 
quick apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not 
equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be understood 
by every one. 
First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real 
and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof a 
chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in 
the mind, that is, they are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the 
sun, moon and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, 
trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so many 
chimeras and illusions on the fancy? To all which, and whatever else of the 
same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles premised we are 
not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or 
anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real as 
ever. There is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities and 
chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from sect. 29, 30, and 33, 
where we have shewn what is meant by real things in opposition to chimeras 
or ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, 
and in that sense they are alike ideas. 
35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can 
apprehend either by sense or reflexion. That the things I see with my eyes 
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and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. 
The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call 
Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done 
to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist 
indeed will want the colour of an empty name to support his impiety; and 
the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling 
and disputation. 
36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he 
is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms 
I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said:- There are 
spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas in 
themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady in respect of 
others they perceive by sense- which, being impressed upon them according 
to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind 
more powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter are said to have 
more reality in them than the former:- by which is meant that they are more 
affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind 
perceiving them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, 
and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here 
given of reality it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in 
general each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by our 
principles as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the term reality 
different from what I do, I entreat them to look into their own thoughts and 
see. 
37. I will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we take away 
all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance be 
taken in the vulgar sense- for a combination of sensible qualities, such as 
extension, solidity, weight, and the like- this we cannot be accused of taking 
away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense- for the support of accidents 
or qualities without the mind- then indeed I acknowledge that we take it 
away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, 
not even in the imagination. 
38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat and drink ideas, 
and are clothed with ideas. I acknowledge it does so- the word idea not 
being used in common discourse to signify the several combinations of 
sensible qualities which are called things; and it is certain that any 
expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh 
and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition, which 
in other words is no more than to say, we are fed and clothed with those 
things which we perceive immediately by our senses. The hardness or 
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softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or suchlike qualities, which 
combined together constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel, have 
been shewn to exist only in the mind that perceives them; and this is all that 
is meant by calling them ideas; which word if it was as ordinarily used as 
thing, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for 
disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If therefore 
you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate 
objects of sense, which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind, I shall 
readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be 
called things rather than ideas. 
39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word idea, and do not rather in 
compliance with custom call them things; I answer, I do it for two reasons:- 
first, because the term thing in contra-distinction to idea, is generally 
supposed to denote somewhat existing without the mind; secondly, because 
thing hath a more comprehensive signification than idea, including spirit or 
thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the objects of sense exist 
only in the mind, and are withal thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark 
them by the word idea, which implies those properties. 
40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt to reply, he will still 
believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments, how plausible soever, to 
prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so; assert the evidence of sense as 
high as you please, we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and 
feel doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do 
of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged 
as a proof for the existence of anything which is not perceived by sense. We 
are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the 
contrary, we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable; nor are there 
any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as 
shall be hereafter clearly shewn. 
41. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real 
fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself 
burnt, and actually being so: if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire 
which you see, do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a 
witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all 
which the answer is evident from what hath been already said; and I shall 
only add in this place, that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire, 
so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the 
same pain, and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can 
possibly be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than its 
idea. 
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42. Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually without or at 
distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind; it being 
absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles 
should be as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it 
may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a 
great distance off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledged to have 
their existence only in the mind. 
43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to 
consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance 
by sight. For, that we should in truth see external space, and bodies actually 
existing in it, some nearer, others farther off, seems to carry with it some 
opposition to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the 
mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my "Essay 
towards a New Theory of Vision," which was published not long since, 
wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither immediately of itself 
perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or 
anything that hath a necessary connexion with it; but that it is only 
suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending 
vision, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation 
either with distance or things placed at a distance; but, by a connexion 
taught us by experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, after 
the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they are made 
to stand for; insomuch that a man born blind and afterwards made to see, 
would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without his mind, or at 
any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the fore-mentioned treatise. 
44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely distinct and 
heterogeneous. The former are marks and prognostics of the latter. That the 
proper objects of sight neither exist without mind, nor are the images of 
external things, was shewn even in that treatise. Though throughout the 
same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects- not that to suppose 
that vulgar error was necessary for establishing the notion therein laid down, 
but because it was beside my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse 
concerning Vision. So that in strict truth the ideas of sight, when we 
apprehend by them distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest 
or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only admonish us 
what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such 
distances of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, 
evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and 
in sect. 147 and elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas 
are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend 
informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we 
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excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in 
this point I refer to the Essay itself. 
45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows 
things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense 
exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, or 
the chairs in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to 
perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is 
reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is again created. In 
answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, 
&c., and desire he will consider whether he means anything by the actual 
existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the 
nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is 
meant by those words; and I once more entreat the reader to sound his own 
thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can 
conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without 
being perceived, then I give up the cause; but if he cannot, he will 
acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows 
not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity the not assenting to 
those propositions which at bottom have no meaning in them. 
46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of 
philosophy are themselves chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is 
thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects 
around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what 
philosophers commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that 
light and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects of sight, 
are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived? Again, it 
may to some perhaps seem very incredible that things should be every 
moment creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in the schools. 
For the Schoolmen, though they acknowledge the existence of Matter, and 
that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of 
opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by 
them is expounded to be a continual creation. 
47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that though we allow the 
existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably follow, 
from the principles which are now generally admitted, that the particular 
bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them exist whilst they are not 
perceived. For, it is evident from sect. II and the following sections, that the 
Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible somewhat, which 
hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our 
senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make this more plain, it 
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must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of Matter is now universally 
allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who 
on the received principles demonstrate it beyond all exception. Hence, it 
follows there is an infinite number of parts in each particle of Matter which 
are not perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body 
seems to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to 
sense, is, not because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an 
infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough to discern 
them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it 
perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object appears 
greater, and its figure varies, those parts in its extremities which were before 
unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different lines and angles 
from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at length, after various 
changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body 
shall seem infinite. During all which there is no alteration in the body, but 
only in the sense. Each body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely 
extended, and consequently void of all shape or figure. From which it 
follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter to be never so 
certain, yet it is withal as certain, the materialists themselves are by their 
own principles forced to acknowledge, that neither the particular bodies 
perceived by sense, nor anything like them, exists without the mind. Matter, 
I say, and each particle thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless, 
and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the 
visible world, any one whereof does not exist longer than it is perceived. 
48. If we consider it, the objection proposed in sect. 45 will not be found 
reasonably charged on the principles we have premised, so as in truth to 
make any objection at all against our notions. For, though we hold indeed 
the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist 
unperceived; yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except 
only while they are perceived by us, since there may be some other spirit 
that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no 
existence without the mind, I would not be understood to mean this or that 
particular mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from 
the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every 
moment, or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of 
them. 
49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only 
in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended and figured; since extension 
is a mode or attribute which (to speak with the schools) is predicated of the 
subject in which it exists. I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as 
they are perceived by it- that is, not by way of mode or attribute, but only by 
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way of idea; and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended, because 
extension exists in it alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those 
colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. As to 
what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and 
unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, extended, and 
square," they will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance, 
distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, 
and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be 
nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. 
And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those 
qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an 
explication of the meaning of the word die. 
50. Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many things explained by 
matter and motion; take away these and you destroy the whole corpuscular 
philosophy, and undermine those mechanical principles which have been 
applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In short, 
whatever advances have been made, either by ancient or modern 
philosophers, in the study of nature do all proceed on the supposition that 
corporeal substance or Matter doth really exist. To this I answer that there is 
not any one phenomenon explained on that supposition which may not as 
well be explained without it, as might easily be made appear by an induction 
of particulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew why, upon 
such and such occasions, we are affected with such and such ideas. But how 
Matter should operate on a Spirit, or produce any idea in it, is what no 
philosopher will pretend to explain; it is therefore evident there can be no 
use of Matter in natural philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account 
for things do it not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and other 
qualities, which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and, therefore, cannot 
be the cause of anything, as hath been already shewn. See sect. 25. 
51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does not seem 
absurd to take away natural causes, and ascribe everything to the immediate 
operation of Spirits? We must no longer say upon these principles that fire 
heats, or water cools, but that a Spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man 
be deservedly laughed at, who should talk after this manner? I answer, he 
would so; in such things we ought to "think with the learned, and speak with 
the vulgar." They who to demonstration are convinced of the truth of the 
Copernican system do nevertheless say "the sun rises," "the sun sets," or 
"comes to the meridian"; and if they affected a contrary style in common 
talk it would without doubt appear very ridiculous. A little reflexion on what 
is here said will make it manifest that the common use of language would 
receive no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/berkeley.html (32 of 72)3/14/2005 1:26:42 AM
George Berkeley A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
tenets. 
52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained, so long as 
they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions to act in such a manner 
as is necessary for our well-being, how false soever they may be if taken in 
a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety 
being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, 
which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible, even in the most 
rigid, philosophic reasonings, so far to alter the bent and genius of the 
tongue we speak, as never to give a handle for cavillers to pretend 
difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair and ingenuous reader will collect 
the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion of a discourse, making 
allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made 
inevitable. 
53. As to the opinion that there are no Corporeal Causes, this has been 
heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others 
among the modern philosophers, who though they allow Matter to exist, yet 
will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things. These 
men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any 
power or activity included in it; and that by consequence this was likewise 
true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without the mind, like unto 
the immediate objects of sense. But then, that they should suppose an 
innumerable multitude of created beings, which they acknowledge are not 
capable of producing any one effect in nature, and which therefore are made 
to no manner of purpose, since God might have done everything as well 
without them: this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a 
very unaccountable and extravagant supposition. 
54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind may be 
thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter, or the existence 
of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if 
so, what cause can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error? 
I answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be found so 
many as is imagined do really believe the existence of Matter or things 
without the mind. Strictly speaking, to believe that which involves a 
contradiction, or has no meaning in it, is impossible; and whether the 
foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial 
examination of the reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe 
that Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their 
sensations, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly present to 
them, were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly 
apprehend any meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a settled 
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speculative opinion, is what I am not able to conceive. This is not the only 
instance wherein men impose upon themselves, by imagining they believe 
those propositions which they have often heard, though at bottom they have 
no meaning in them. 
55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be never so universally 
and steadfastly adhered to, yet this is weak argument of its truth to whoever 
considers what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions are 
everywhere embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting 
(which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time when the 
antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous 
absurdities even by men of learning: and if it be considered what a small 
proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day 
those notions have gained but a very inconsiderable footing in the world. 
56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice, and account 
for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer, that men knowing they 
perceived several ideas, whereof they themselves were not the authors- as 
not being excited from within nor depending on the operation of their wills- 
this made them maintain those ideas, or objects of perception had an 
existence independent of and without the mind, without ever dreaming that a 
contradiction was involved in those words. But, philosophers having plainly 
seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind, 
they in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar; but at the same 
time run into another which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there are 
certain objects really existing without the mind, or having a subsistence 
distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or 
resemblances, imprinted by those objects on the mind. And this notion of 
the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former, namely, 
their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, 
which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and which 
therefore must have some cause distinct from the minds on which they are 
imprinted. 
57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by 
things in their likeness, and not rather have recourse to Spirit which alone 
can act, may be accounted for, first, because they were not aware of the 
repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing 
without, as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, because the 
Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked out 
and limited to our view by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, 
as human agents are by their size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And 
thirdly, because His operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the 
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course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the 
presence of a superior agent. But, when we see things go on in the ordinary 
course they do not excite in us any reflexion; their order and concatenation, 
though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in 
their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them 
the immediate effects of a Free Spirit; especially since inconsistency and 
mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked on as a mark of 
freedom. 
58. Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent 
with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the 
motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth 
grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing 
principles, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only an idea, it 
follows that if it be not perceived it exists not; but the motion of the earth is 
not perceived by sense. I answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be 
found to agree with the principles we have premised; for, the question 
whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to 
wit, whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been observed by 
astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and 
such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should 
perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing 
in all respects like one of them; and this, by the established rules of nature 
which we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the 
phenomena. 
59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and succession of 
ideas in our minds, often make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure 
and well-grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be affected 
with pursuant to a great train of actions, and be enabled to pass a right 
judgment of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in 
circumstances very different from those we are in at present. Herein consists 
the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its use and certainty very 
consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to 
whatever objections of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the 
stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. 
60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what purpose serves that 
curious organization of plants, and the animal mechanism in the parts of 
animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves of blossoms, and 
animals perform all their motions as well without as with all that variety of 
internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together; which, being ideas, 
have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary 
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connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that 
immediately produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think 
all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, to be 
made in vain. By this doctrine, though an artist hath made the spring and 
wheels, and every movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a 
manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed, yet he must 
think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence which directs 
the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so, why may not the 
Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the movements 
and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as 
another? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the 
going of a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the 
movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again? The 
like may be said of all the clockwork of nature, great part whereof is so 
wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best 
microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our principles, any 
tolerable account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an 
innumerable multitude of bodies and machines, framed with the most 
exquisite art, which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses 
assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phenomena? 
61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were some difficulties 
relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to 
the several parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing 
principles, yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and 
certainty of those things which may be proved a priori, with the utmost 
evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly, but neither are the received 
principles free from the like difficulties; for, it may still be demanded to 
what end God should take those roundabout methods of effecting things by 
instruments and machines, which no one can deny might have been effected 
by the mere command of His will without all that apparatus; nay, if we 
narrowly consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted with greater 
force on those who hold the existence of those machines without of mind; 
for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like 
have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable of producing any 
one effect in nature. See sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist 
(allowing the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it 
manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned to them, as they 
exist unperceived, is that they produce those perceivable effects which in 
truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit. 
62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed that though the 
fabrication of all those parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the 
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producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in a 
constant regular way according to the laws of nature. There are certain 
general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects; these are 
learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as 
well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life as to the 
explaining various phenomena- which explication consists only in shewing 
the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of 
nature, or, which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in 
the production of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend 
to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to account for 
appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous use in these regular 
constant methods of working observed by the Supreme Agent hath been 
shewn in sect. 31. And it is no less visible that a particular size, figure, 
motion, and disposition of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the 
producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing 
mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, 
or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, 
might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions on the 
dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put 
them in it: but yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by 
Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary 
that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby he makes the movements and 
rightly adjusts them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions; as 
also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some 
corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is 
right again. 
63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the Author of nature 
display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the 
ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of nature 
are proper to surprise and awe men into an acknowledgement of the Divine 
Being; but then they are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain 
reason why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the 
convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature, which 
discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make, and are such plain 
indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author, rather than to 
astonish us into a belief of His Being by anomalous and surprising events. 
64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what has been 
objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than this:- ideas are not 
anyhow and at random produced, there being a certain order and connexion 
between them, like to that of cause and effect; there are also several 
combinations of them made in a very regular and artificial manner, which 
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seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being hid as it 
were behind the scenes, have a secret operation in producing those 
appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves 
discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea 
cannot be the cause of another, to what purpose is that connexion? And, 
since those instruments, being barely inefficacious perceptions in the mind, 
are not subservient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why 
they are made; or, in other words, what reason can be assigned why God 
should make us, upon a close inspection into His works, behold so great 
variety of ideas so artfully laid together, and so much according to rule; it 
not being credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of 
all that art and regularity to no purpose. 
65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not 
imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the 
thing signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon 
my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the 
noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the 
ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are 
formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the 
same with that for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas 
may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary 
they be variously combined together. And, to the end their use be permanent 
and universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with wise 
contrivance. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, 
concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions and what 
methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas; which 
in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that, by 
discerning a figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, 
whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and 
properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing. 
66. Hence, it is evident that those things which, under the notion of a cause 
co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether 
inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally 
explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them, when they 
are considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is the 
searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by the 
Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural 
philosopher; and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes, 
which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from 
that active principle, that supreme and wise Spirit "in whom we live, move, 
and have our being." 
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67. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected that- though it be clear 
from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert, 
senseless, extended, solid, figured, movable substance existing without the 
mind, such as philosophers describe Matter- yet, if any man shall leave out 
of his idea of matter the positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity and 
motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert, senseless 
substance, that exists without the mind or unperceived, which is the 
occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite 
ideas in us: it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may 
possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to 
suppose a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents 
without a substance. But secondly, though we should grant this unknown 
substance may possibly exist, yet where can it be supposed to be? That it 
exists not in the mind is agreed; and that it exists not in place is no less 
certain- since all place or extension exists only in the mind, as hath been 
already proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all. 
68. Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of matter. It 
neither acts, nor perceives, nor is perceived; for this is all that is meant by 
saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; which is a definition 
entirely made up of negatives, excepting only the relative notion of its 
standing under or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports 
nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of a nonentity I 
desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the unknown occasion, at the 
presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now, I would 
fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable 
by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor 
is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words "to 
be present," when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and 
strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehend. 
69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So far as I can gather 
from the common use of language, that word signifies either the agent which 
produces any effect, or else something that is observed to accompany or go 
before it in the ordinary course of things. But when it is applied to Matter as 
above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses; for Matter is said 
to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause. It is 
also unperceivable, as being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot 
be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense: as when the burning 
my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What 
therefore can be meant by calling matter an occasion? The term is either 
used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its received 
signification. 
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70. You will Perhaps say that Matter, though it be not perceived by us, is 
nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas 
in our minds. For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be imprinted 
in an orderly and constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are 
certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That is to 
say, that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter, 
corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do not excite them in our 
minds, or anywise immediately affect us, as being altogether passive and 
unperceivable to us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they art 
perceived, as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas 
to imprint on our minds; that so things may go on in a constant uniform 
manner. 
71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter is here stated, 
the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from 
Spirit and idea, from perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are 
not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind of God which are so 
many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our 
minds in a constant and regular method- much after the same manner as a 
musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train 
and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the 
music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But, 
this notion of Matter seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. 
Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that 
there is no senseless unperceived substance. 
72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform 
method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who 
excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably concluded 
from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a spirit infinitely 
wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the 
appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless Matter, nothing that I 
perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. 
And I would fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in 
nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of 
probability, that he can have for its existence, or even make any tolerable 
sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion, we 
have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. It 
remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting 
ideas in us; and what this amounts to we have just now seen. 
73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced men to 
suppose the existence of material substance; that so having observed the 
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gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may 
proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, 
therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the 
sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this 
reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum or 
substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be conceived to exist 
by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men being convinced that 
colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no 
existence without the mind, they stripped this substratum or material 
substance of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, 
and suchlike, which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and 
consequently to stand in need of a material support. But, it having been 
shewn that none even of these can possibly exist otherwise than in a Spirit 
or Mind which perceives them it follows that we have no longer any reason 
to suppose the being of Matter; nay, that it is utterly impossible there should 
be any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote an unthinking 
substratum of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind. 
74. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was 
thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely 
ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally, and without any 
reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was solely grounded thereon; yet the 
prejudice is riveted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to 
part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing itself is indefensible, 
at least to retain the name, which we apply to I know not what abstracted 
and indefinite notions of being, or occasion, though without any show of 
reason, at least so far as I can see. For, what is there on our part, or what do 
we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted 
on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the 
existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other 
hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should 
make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite 
ideas in our minds? 
75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to 
be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the 
evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by the interposition 
whereof it would as it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and 
remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the 
utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter, though, when reason forsakes 
us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, 
and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not 
regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, 
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that there are certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if 
anything, is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. 
And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the 
name. 
76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether 
they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But, if you stick 
to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, 
and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there 
should be any such thing, since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities 
should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance. 
77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of 
extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive, yet there 
may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or substratum of some 
other qualities, as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind, 
because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a new sense, 
we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made 
to see does of the existence of light and colours. I answer, first, if what you 
mean by the word Matter be only the unknown support of unknown 
qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way 
concerns us; and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what 
we know not what, and we know not why. 
78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new 
ideas or sensations; and then we should have the same reason against their 
existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with 
relation to figure, motion, colour and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, 
are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind 
perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted 
with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever. 
79. But, you will insist, what if I have no reason to believe the existence of 
Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it, or 
even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still it is no contradiction to 
say that Matter exists, and that this Matter is in general a substance, or 
occasion of ideas; though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning or 
adhere to any particular explication of those words may be attended with 
great difficulties. I answer, when words are used without a meaning, you 
may put them together as you please without danger of running into a 
contradiction. You may say, for example, that twice two is equal to seven, 
so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their 
usual acceptation but for marks of you know not what. And, by the same 
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reason, you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without 
accidents which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just as 
much by one proposition as the other. 
80. In the last place, you will say, what if we give up the cause of material 
Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an unknown somewhat- neither 
substance nor accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, 
immovable, unextended, existing in no place. For, say you, whatever may be 
urged against substance or occasion, or any other positive or relative notion 
of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this negative definition of Matter is 
adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem good, use the word 
"Matter" in the same sense as other men use "nothing," and so make those 
terms convertible in your style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to 
be the result of that definition, the parts whereof when I consider with 
attention, either collectively or separate from each other, I do not find that 
there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from 
what is excited by the term nothing. 
81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore-said definition is included what 
doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing- the positive abstract idea of 
quiddity, entity, or existence. I own, indeed, that those who pretend to the 
faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, 
which is, say they, the most abstract and general notion of all; that is, to me, 
the most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety of 
spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties both in number and 
extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on me, I 
see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to determine by my own few, 
stinted narrow inlets of perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of 
the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly 
and presumption- since there may be, for aught that I know, innumerable 
sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one another, and from all that I 
have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But, how ready soever I may be 
to acknowledge the scantiness of my comprehension with regard to the 
endless variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any one to 
pretend to a notion of Entity or Existence, abstracted from spirit and idea, 
from perceived and being perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy 
and trifling with words.- It remains that we consider the objections which 
may possibly be made on the part of Religion. 
82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for the real 
existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount 
to demonstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as will 
sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist, and 
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are something more than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable 
facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, 
mountains and rivers, and cities, and human bodies. To which I answer that 
no sort of writings whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the like 
words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a meaning in them, are in 
danger of having their truth called in question by our doctrine. That all those 
things do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal substances, when 
taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles; 
and the difference betwixt things and ideas, realities and chimeras, has been 
distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that 
either what philosophers call Matter, or the existence of objects without the 
mind, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture. 
83. Again, whether there can be or be not external things, it is agreed on all 
hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things 
only as they are known and perceived by us; whence it plainly follows that 
in the tenets we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right 
use and significancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever, so 
far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so manifest, 
from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to 
insist any farther on it. 
84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their stress 
and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' rod? was it not 
really turned into a serpent; or was there only a change of ideas in the minds 
of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more at 
the marriage-feast in Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of 
the guests, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The 
same may be said of all other miracles; which, in consequence of the 
foregoing principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or 
illusions of fancy. To this I reply, that the rod was changed into a real 
serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least 
contradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. 
But this business of real and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully 
explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily 
answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to the reader's 
understanding to resume the explication of it in its place. I shall only 
observe that if at table all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, 
and drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of 
its reality; so that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no 
place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently 
makes rather for than against what has been said. 
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85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured to propose in the 
clearest light, and gave them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in 
the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. Some of 
these appear at first sight- as that several difficult and obscure questions, on 
which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are entirely 
banished from philosophy. "Whether corporeal substance can think," 
"whether Matter be infinitely divisible," and "how it operates on spirit"- 
these and like inquiries have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all 
ages; but depending on the existence of Matter, they have no longer any 
place on our principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with 
regard to religion as the sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce 
from what has been premised; but this will appear more plainly in the 
sequel. 
86. From the principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may 
naturally be reduced to two heads- that of ideas and that of spirits. Of each 
of these I shall treat in order. And first as to ideas or unthinking things. Our 
knowledge of these hath been very much obscured and confounded, and we 
have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence 
of the objects of sense- the one intelligible or in the mind, the other real and 
without the mind; whereby unthinking things are thought to have a natural 
subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, 
which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd 
notion, is the very root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real 
things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far 
forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows they could not be 
certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that the 
things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not 
perceived, or exist without the mind? 
87. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered only as so 
many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in 
them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as notes or images, 
referred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then are we 
involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real 
qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of anything 
really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only 
the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the 
same, our ideas vary, and which of them, or even whether any of them at all, 
represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach to 
determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear, and feel may be 
only phantom and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things 
existing in rerum natura. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a 
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difference between things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistence 
without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, and 
show how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the 
supposition of external objects. 
88. So long as we attribute a real existence to unthinking things, distinct 
from their being perceived, it is not only impossible for us to know with 
evidence the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that it exists. 
Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses, and doubt of the 
existence of heaven and earth, of everything they see or feel, even of their 
own bodies. And, after all their labour and struggle of thought, they are 
forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative 
knowledge of the existence of sensible things. But, all this doubtfulness, 
which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy 
ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex a meaning to our 
words. and not amuse ourselves with the terms "absolute," "external," "exist, 
"and such-like, signifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of my own 
being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense; it 
being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be 
immediately perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no 
existence in nature, since the very existence of an unthinking being consists 
in being perceived. 
89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of 
sound and real knowledge, which may be proof against the assaults of 
Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is 
meant by thing, reality, existence; for in vain shall we dispute concerning 
the real existence of things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as 
we have not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or Being is the most 
general name of all; it comprehends under it two kinds entirely distinct and 
heterogeneous, and which have nothing common but the name. viz. spirits 
and ideas. The former are active, indivisible substances: the latter are inert, 
fleeting, dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves, but are 
supported by, or exist in minds or spiritual substances. We comprehend our 
own existence by inward feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by 
reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own 
minds, of spirits and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not 
ideas. In like manner, we know and have a notion of relations between 
things or ideas- which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, 
inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the 
former. To me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their 
respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; 
and that the term idea would be improperly extended to signify everything 
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we know or have any notion of. 
90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do really exist; this we 
do not deny, but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive 
them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the 
mind; since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived, 
and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the things perceived by 
sense may be termed external, with regard to their origin- in that they are not 
generated from within by the mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct 
from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be 
"without the mind" in another sense, namely when they exist in some other 
mind; thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but it must 
be in another mind. 
91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates in the least 
from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on the received principles, 
that extension, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a 
support, as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects 
perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those 
qualities, and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is 
agreed on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an 
existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may exist, we 
detract nothing from the received opinion of their reality, and are guilty of 
no innovation in that respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the 
unthinking beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being 
perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than those 
unextended indivisible substances or spirits which act and think and 
perceive them; whereas philosophers vulgarly hold that the sensible qualities 
do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call 
Matter, to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking 
beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the 
eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they suppose only ideas of the 
corporeal substances created by him; if indeed they allow them to be at all 
created. 
92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or corporeal substance to 
have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism, so likewise upon the 
same foundation have been raised all the impious schemes of Atheism and 
Irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter 
produced out of nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient 
philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of a God, have 
thought Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him. How great a friend 
material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were needless to relate. 
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All their monstrous systems have so visible and necessary a dependence on 
it that, when this corner-stone is once removed, the whole fabric cannot 
choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is no longer worth while to 
bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect 
of Atheists. 
93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those 
systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding immaterial substance, 
and supposing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption as the body; 
which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of 
things, and instead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance 
the root and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those who deny 
a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, 
attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance or fatal necessity 
arising from the impulse of one body or another- all this is very natural. 
And, on the other hand, when men of better principles observe the enemies 
of religion lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all of them use so 
much industry and artifice to reduce everything to it, methinks they should 
rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from that 
only fortress, without which your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have 
not even the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy 
triumph in the world. 
94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not only been the 
main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the same principle doth 
Idolatry likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider that 
the sun, moon, and stars, and every other object of the senses are only so 
many sensations in their minds, which have no other existence but barely 
being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their 
own ideas, but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL INVISIBLE 
MIND which produces and sustains all things. 
95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our 
faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example, about 
the Resurrection, how many scruples and objections have been raised by 
Socinians and others? But do not the most plausible of them depend on the 
supposition that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the form 
or that which is perceived by sense, but the material substance, which 
remains the same under several forms? Take away this material substance, 
about the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every 
plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately 
seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas, and 
then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing. 
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96. Matter being once expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical 
and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling 
questions, which have been thorns in the sides of divines as well as 
philosophers, and made so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the 
arguments we have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration 
(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to knowledge, 
peace, and religion have reason to wish they were. 
97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another great 
source of errors and difficulties with regard to ideal knowledge is the 
doctrine of abstract ideas, such as it hath been set forth in the Introduction. 
The plainest things in the world, those we are most intimately acquainted 
with and perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way, 
appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place, and motion, 
taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody knows, but, having 
passed through the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract and 
fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet you 
at such a time in such a place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the 
meaning of those words; in conceiving that particular time and place, or the 
motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not the least difficulty. But if 
time be taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that 
diversify the day, merely for the continuation of existence or duration in 
abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it. 
98. For my own part, whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, 
abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly 
and is participated by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable 
difficulties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others say it is infinitely 
divisible, and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd 
thoughts of my existence; since that doctrine lays one under an absolute 
necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable ages without a 
thought, or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life, both which 
seem equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing, abstracted from the 
sucession of ideas in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite 
spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each 
other in that same spirit or mind. Hence, it is a plain consequence that the 
soul always thinks; and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his 
thoughts, or abstract the existence of a spirit from its cogitation, will, I 
believe, find it no easy task. 
99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all 
other qualities, and consider them by themselves, we presently lose sight of 
them, and run into great extravagances. All which depend on a twofold 
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abstraction; first, it is supposed that extension, for example, may be 
abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and secondly, that the entity of 
extension may be abstracted from its being perceived. But, whoever shall 
reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, if I mistake not, 
acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike sensations and alike real; 
that where the extension is, there is the colour, too, i.e., in his mind, and that 
their archetypes can exist only in some other mind; and that the objects of 
sense are nothing but those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so 
speak) concreted together; none of all which can be supposed to exist 
unperceived. 
100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good, every one may 
think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from 
all particular pleasure, or of goodness from everything that is good, this is 
what few can pretend to. So likewise a man may be just and virtuous 
without having precise ideas of justice and virtue. The opinion that those 
and the like words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular 
persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality very difficult, and the 
study thereof of small use to mankind. And in effect the doctrine of 
abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts 
of knowledge. 
101. The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas 
received from sense, are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics; with regard 
to each of these I shall make some observations. And first I shall say 
somewhat of Natural Philosophy. On this subject it is that the sceptics 
triumph. All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties 
and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are drawn principally from this 
head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness as to the true and 
real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge on. We are 
miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused only with the 
outside and show of things. The real essence, the internal qualities and 
constitution of every the meanest object, is hid from our view; something 
there is in every drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the 
power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend. But, it is evident 
from what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless, and that we 
are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses, 
and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend. 
102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the 
nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within itself 
the cause of its properties; or that there is in each object an inward essence 
which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they 
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depend. Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult 
qualities, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes, to wit. 
the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of insensible particles; 
whereas, in truth, there is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit, it 
being evident that motion, as well as all other ideas, is perfectly inert. See 
sect. 25. Hence, to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, 
by figure, motion, magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in vain. 
And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory. 
Which may be said in general of those instances wherein one idea or quality 
is assigned for the cause of another. I need not say how many hypotheses 
and speculations are left out, and how much the study of nature is abridged 
by this doctrine. 
103. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That a stone 
falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some appear 
sufficiently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told 
this is done by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the manner of the 
tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead of their 
being impelled or protruded towards each other? But, nothing is determined 
of the manner or action, and it may as truly (for aught we know) be termed 
"impulse," or "protrusion," as "attraction." Again, the parts of steel we see 
cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for by attraction; but, in 
this as in the other instances, I do not perceive that anything is signified 
besides the effect itself; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is 
produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at. 
104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena, and compare them 
together, we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For 
example, in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea 
towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, etc, there is something alike, 
namely, an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or 
the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man who has 
nicely observed and compared the effects of nature. For that only is thought 
so which is uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary course of 
our observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the earth is 
not thought strange, because it is what we perceive every moment of our 
lives. But, that they should have a like gravitation towards the centre of the 
moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men, because it is discerned 
only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a larger compass 
of nature, having observed a certain similitude of appearances, as well in the 
heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual 
tendency towards each other, which he denotes by the general name 
"attraction," whatever can be reduced to that he thinks justly accounted for. 
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Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards 
the moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only a 
particular example of a general rule or law of nature. 
105. If therefore we consider the difference there is betwixt natural 
philosophers and other men, with regard to their knowledge of the 
phenomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the 
efficient cause that produces them- for that can be no other than the will of a 
spirit- but only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies, 
harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature, and the 
particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 62, 
which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the 
production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after by the 
mind; for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to 
us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that 
may have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well as to 
predict things to come; which sort of endeavour towards omniscience is 
much affected by the mind. 
106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are apt to lay too 
great stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that 
eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into 
general theorems. For example, in the business of gravitation or mutual 
attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are straightway for 
pronouncing it universal; and that to attract and be attracted by every other 
body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is 
evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; and, so far 
is that gravitation from being essential to bodies that in some instances a 
quite contrary principle seems to shew itself; as in the perpendicular growth 
of plants, and the elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential 
in the case, but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who 
causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other 
according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed distance; and to 
some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He sees 
convenient. 
107. After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following 
conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when 
they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from a mind or spirit. 
Secondly, considering the whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and 
good Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ their 
thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of things; and I 
confess I see no reason why pointing out the various ends to which natural 
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things are adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable 
wisdom contrived, should not be thought one good way of accounting for 
them, and altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been 
premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still 
be studied, and observations and experiments made, which, that they are of 
use to mankind, and enable us to draw any general conclusions, is not the 
result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves, 
but only of God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the 
world. See sect. 30 and 31 Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the 
phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws of nature, 
and from them deduce the other phenomena; I do not say demonstrate, for 
all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature 
always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we 
take for principles: which we cannot evidently know. 
108. Those men who frame general rules from the phenomena and 
afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules, seem to consider signs 
rather than causes. A man may well understand natural signs without 
knowing their analogy, or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so. 
And, as it is very possible to write improperly, through too strict an 
observance of general grammar rules; so, in arguing from general laws of 
nature, it is not impossible we may extend the analogy too far, and by that 
means run into mistakes. 
109. As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on 
the sense and apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical 
remarks on the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, it seems 
beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each 
particular phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how it follows from 
them. We should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and 
exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order. extent, and variety of 
natural things: hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the 
grandeur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the 
several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the ends they 
were designed for, God's glory, and the sustentation and comfort of 
ourselves and fellow-creatures. 
110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily 
acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of Mechanics. In the 
entrance of which justly admired treatise, Time, Space, and Motion are 
distinguished into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and 
vulgar; which distinction, as it is at large explained by the author, does 
suppose these quantities to have an existence without the mind; and that 
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they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to which 
nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all. 
111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted sense, for 
the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more 
to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject. Sect. 
97 and 98. For the rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute 
Space, which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar and 
immovable; and relative space to be the measure thereof, which, being 
movable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies, is 
vulgarly taken for immovable space. Place he defines to be that part of space 
which is occupied by any body; and according as the space is absolute or 
relative so also is the place. Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of 
a body from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from one 
relative place to another. And, because the parts of absolute space do not fall 
under our senses, instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible 
measures, and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which 
we regard as immovable. But, it is said in philosophical matters we must 
abstract from our senses, since it may be that none of those bodies which 
seem to be quiescent are truly so, and the same thing which is moved 
relatively may be really at rest; as likewise one and the same body may be in 
relative rest and motion, or even moved with contrary relative motions at the 
same time, according as its place is variously defined. All which ambiguity 
is to be found in the apparent motions, but not at all in the true or absolute, 
which should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true as we 
are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions by the following 
properties.- First, in true or absolute motion all parts which preserve the 
same position with respect of the whole, partake of the motions of the 
whole. Secondly, the place being moved, that which is placed therein is also 
moved; so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate 
the motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed 
otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. Fourthly, true motion 
is always changed by force impressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in 
circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force, which, 
nevertheless, in that which is true or absolute, is proportional to the quantity 
of motion. 
112. But, notwithstanding what has been said, I must confess it does not 
appear to me that there can be any motion other than relative; so that to 
conceive motion there must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the 
distance or position in regard to each other is varied. Hence, if there was one 
only body in being it could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in 
that the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation. 
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113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to conceive more bodies 
than one, yet it may be that one only is moved, namely, that on which the 
force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies, is 
impressed. For, however some may define relative motion, so as to term that 
body moved which changes its distance from some other body, whether the 
force or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as 
relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded in the 
ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every man of common sense 
knows what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now, I ask any one 
whether, in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones he 
passes over may be said to move, because they change distance with his 
feet? To me it appears that though motion includes a relation of one thing to 
another, yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated 
from it. As a man may think of somewhat which does not think, so a body 
may be moved to or from another body which is not therefore itself in 
motion. 
114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion which is 
related to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation 
to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he may 
move eastward in respect of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In 
the common affairs of life men never go beyond the earth to define the place 
of any body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted absolutely 
to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent of thought, and juster 
notions of the system of things, discover even the earth itself to be moved. 
In order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal 
world as finite, and the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the 
place whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, 
I believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea of to be 
at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. For, as hath been 
already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is 
incomprehensible; and to this kind of relative motion all the above-
mentioned properties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if 
I mistake not, be found to agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, 
that it does not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how this 
follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. See Philosophiae 
Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. VIII. For the water in the 
vessel at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular 
motion, hath, I think, no motion at all; as is plain from the foregoing section. 
115. For, to denominate a body moved it is requisite, first, that it change its 
distance or situation with regard to some other body; and secondly, that the 
force occasioning that change be applied to it. If either of these be wanting, I 
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do not think that, agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of 
language, a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is 
possible for us to think a body which we see change its distance from some 
other to be moved, though it have no force applied to it (in which sense 
there may be apparent motion), but then it is because the force causing the 
change of distance is imagined by us to be applied or impressed on that 
body thought to move; which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a 
thing to be in motion which is not, and that is all. 
116. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration 
of motion does not imply the being of an absolute Space, distinct from that 
which is perceived by sense and related bodies; which that it cannot exist 
without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like 
of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall 
find we cannot even frame an idea of pure Space exclusive of all body. This 
I must confess seems impossible, as being a most abstract idea. When I 
excite a motion in some part of my body, if it be free or without resistance, I 
say there is Space; but if I find a resistance, then I say there is Body; and in 
proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is 
more or less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, it is not to 
be supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or 
conceivable without body and motion- though indeed we are apt to think 
every noun substantive stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from 
all others; which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, 
supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there 
still remains pure Space, thereby nothing else is meant but only that I 
conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides 
without the least resistance, but if that, too, were annihilated then there 
could be no motion, and consequently no Space. Some, perhaps, may think 
the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure space; but it is 
plain from what we have elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and 
distance are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay concerning Vision. 
117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and 
difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of 
pure Space. But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from 
that dangerous dilemma, to which several who have employed their thoughts 
on that subject imagine themselves reduced, to wit, of thinking either that 
Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God which is 
eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both which may justly 
be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain that not a few divines, 
as well as philosophers of great note, have, from the difficulty they found in 
conceiving either limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be 
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divine. And some of late have set themselves particularly to shew the 
incommunicable attributes of God agree to it. Which doctrine, how 
unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I do not see how we 
can get clear of it, so long as we adhere to the received opinions. 
118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy: we come now to make some inquiry 
concerning that other great branch of speculative knowledge, to wit, 
Mathematics. These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness 
and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be found, 
cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if in their 
principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the professors 
of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Mathematicians, though they 
deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence, yet their first 
principles are limited by the consideration of quantity: and they do not 
ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which 
influence all the particular sciences, each part whereof, Mathematics not 
excepted, does consequently participate of the errors involved in them. That 
the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and their way of 
deduction from those principles clear and incontestible, we do not deny; but, 
we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the 
object of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned, though 
tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science; and that the 
ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the 
branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as 
other men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract 
general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind. 
119. Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of 
Number; of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is 
supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of the pure 
and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with 
those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and 
elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical 
speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only for amusement; 
and hath therefore so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamed 
of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted the explication of 
natural things by them. But, if we inquire into our own thoughts, and 
consider what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion 
of those high flights and abstractions, and look on all inquiries, about 
numbers only as so many difficiles nugae, so far as they are not subservient 
to practice, and promote the benefit of life. 
120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13, from which 
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and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly follows there is not any 
such idea. But, number being defined a "collection of units," we may 
conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit in abstract, there are 
no ideas of number in abstract denoted by the numeral names and figures. 
The theories therefore in Arithmetic. if they are abstracted from the names 
and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well as from the 
particular things numbered, can be supposed to have nothing at all for their 
object; hence we may see how entirely the science of numbers is 
subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it becomes when 
considered as a matter of mere speculation. 
121. However, since there may be some who, deluded by the specious show 
of discovering abstracted verities, waste their time in arithmetical theorems 
and problems which have not any use, it will not be amiss if we more fully 
consider and expose the vanity of that pretence; and this will plainly appear 
by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was that 
originally put men on the study of that science, and to what scope they 
directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of memory and 
help of computation, made use of counters, or in writing of single strokes, 
points, or the like, each whereof was made to signify an unit, i.e., some one 
thing of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found 
out the more compendious ways of making one character stand in place of 
several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians 
came into use, wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or figures, and 
varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, all 
numbers may be most aptly expressed; which seems to have been done in 
imitation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed betwixt the 
notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine 
first numeral names and places in the former, corresponding to 
denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those conditions of the simple 
and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding, from the 
given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper 
to denote the whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought figures, the 
same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read them into 
words; and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of 
any particular things is said to be known, when we know the name of figures 
(with their due arrangement) that according to the standing analogy belong 
to them. For, these signs being known, we can by the operations of 
arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by 
them; and, thus computing in signs (because of the connexion established 
betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things whereof one is taken for 
an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, divide, and proportion the things 
themselves that we intend to number. 
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122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, which 
nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us 
how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now, 
agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general (sect. 19, 
Introd.) it happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be 
signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of 
particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a more 
particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe that it is evident from 
what has been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and theorems 
concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from 
particular numeral things, except only names and characters, which 
originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, 
or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to 
compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be 
just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or 
original intention and subserviency of language, should spend his time in 
impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely 
verbal. 
123. From numbers we proceed to speak of Extension, which, considered as 
relative, is the object of Geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite 
extension, though it is not expressly laid down either as an axiom or 
theorem in the elements of that science, yet is throughout the same 
everywhere supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a 
connexion with the principles and demonstrations in Geometry, that 
mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. 
And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing 
geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain 
common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance into a 
mind not yet debauched by learning; so it is the principal occasion of all that 
nice and extreme subtilty which renders the study of Mathematics so 
difficult and tedious. Hence, if we can make it appear that no finite 
extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows 
that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of 
difficulties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to 
human reason, and withal make the attainment thereof a business of much 
less time and pains than it hitherto has been. 
124. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of 
our thought is an idea existing only in the mind, and consequently each part 
thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts 
in any finite extension that I consider, it is certain they are not contained in 
it; but, it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any 
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particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure 
to myself in my mind: wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. 
Nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no 
other than my own ideas; and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one 
of my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, that they are not 
infinitely divisible. If by finite extension be meant something distinct from a 
finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm or deny 
anything of it. But if the terms "extension," "parts," &c., are taken in any 
sense conceivable, that is, for ideas, then to say a finite quantity or extension 
consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest a contradiction, that every 
one at first sight acknowledges it to be so; and it is impossible it should ever 
gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle 
and slow degrees, as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. 
Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles; and those 
propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a principle, are not 
only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from them, thought 
privileged from all examination. And there is no absurdity so gross, which, 
by this means, the mind of man may not be prepared to swallow. 
125. He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract 
general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of 
sense) extension in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who thinks the 
objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be 
brought to admit that a line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts- 
really existing, though too small to be discerned. These errors are grafted as 
well in the minds of geometricians as of other men, and have a like 
influence on their reasonings; and it were no difficult thing to shew how the 
arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of 
extension are bottomed on them. At present we shall only observe in general 
whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that 
doctrine. 
126. It hath been observed in another place that the theorems and 
demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect. 15, 
Introd.); where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood, to 
wit, the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to 
stand for innumerable others of different sizes; or, in other words, the 
geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude- which does not 
imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares not what the 
particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on that as a thing 
different to the demonstration. Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but 
an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, 
since it is regarded not in itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal only 
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in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than 
itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more, though 
there may not be above an inch in it. After this manner, the properties of the 
lines signified are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the sign, and 
thence, through mistake, though to appertain to it considered in its own 
nature. 
127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is possible there may 
be a line containing more, the inch-line is said to contain parts more than 
any assignable number; which is true, not of the inch taken absolutely, but 
only for the things signified by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in 
their thoughts, slide into a belief that the small particular line described on 
paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such thing as the ten-
thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, 
which may be signified by that inch. When therefore I delineate a triangle 
on paper, and take one side not above an inch, for example, in length to be 
the radius, this I consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts or more; 
for, though the ten-thousandth part of that line considered in itself is nothing 
at all, and consequently may be neglected without an error or 
inconveniency, yet these described lines, being only marks standing for 
greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten-thousandth part is very 
considerable, it follows that, to prevent notable errors in practice, the radius 
must be taken of 10,000 parts or more. 
128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the end any 
theorem become universal in its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines 
described on paper as though they contained parts which really they do not. 
In doing of which, if we examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps 
discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being 
divisible into, a thousand parts, but only some other line which is far greater 
than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say a line is infinitely 
divisible, we must mean a line which is infinitely great. What we have here 
observed seems to be the chief cause why, to suppose the infinite divisibility 
of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry. 
129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false 
principle might, one would think, have been esteemed so many 
demonstrations against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held that 
proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted against propositions relating to 
infinity, as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to 
reconcile contradictions; or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have 
a necessary connexion with truth or flow from it. But, whoever considers the 
weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on purpose to humour 
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the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent 
scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of 
those principles it has ever embraced for true. 
130. Of late the speculations about Infinities have run so high, and grown to 
such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes 
among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, 
not content with holding that finite lines may be divided into an infinite 
number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is 
itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a second 
order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of 
infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., without ever coming to an end; so that 
according to them an inch does not barely contain an infinite number of 
parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others 
there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at 
all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive 
quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely, can never 
equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no 
less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a positive real root, 
should itself be nothing at all; which they who hold infinitesimals of the first 
order, denying all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain. 
131. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, 
and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an 
infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say 
that if this doctrine obtains it will follow the very foundations of Geometry 
are destroyed, and those great men who have raised that science to so 
astonishing a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To 
this it may be replied that whatever is useful in geometry, and promotes the 
benefit of human life, does still remain firm and unshaken on our principles; 
that science considered as practical will rather receive advantage than any 
prejudice from what has been said. But to set this in a due light may be the 
proper business of another place. For the rest, though it should follow that 
some of the more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may 
be pared off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage 
will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to 
be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw 
off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of 
such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence 
on the manners. 
132. It is be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by 
methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have 
http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/%7Erbear/berkeley.html (62 of 72)3/14/2005 1:26:42 AM
George Berkeley A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
been if their existence included a contradiction in it; I answer that upon a 
thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary 
to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even 
quantities less than the minimum sensible; nay, it will be evident this is 
never done, it being impossible. 
133. By what we have premised, it is plain that very numerous and 
important errors have taken their rise from those false Principles which were 
impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise; and the opposites of those 
erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from 
whence do flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to true 
philosophy. as well as to religion. Particularly Matter, or the absolute 
existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to be that wherein the most 
avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, 
have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely, if by 
distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being 
perceived, and allowing them a subsistance of their own out of the minds of 
spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many 
inexplicable difficulties arise; if the supposition of Matter is barely 
precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason; if its 
consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry, but 
screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinites being 
incomprehensible"; if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended with 
the least evil consequence; if it be not even missed in the world, but 
everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it; if, lastly, both 
Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and 
ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and 
Religion: methinks we may expect it should be admitted and firmly 
embraced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existence 
of Matter had been allowed possible, which yet I think we have evidently 
demonstrated that it is not. 
134. True it is that, in consequence of the foregoing principles, several 
disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, are 
rejected as useless. But, how great a prejudice soever against our notions 
this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged, and make 
large advances in studies of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be 
thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid 
down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make human sciences far 
more clear, compendious and attainable than they were before. 
135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge 
of IDEAS, the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of 
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SPIRITS- with regard to which, perhaps, human knowledge is not so 
deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason that is assigned for our 
being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an idea of it. 
But, surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human 
understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit, if it is manifestly 
impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake not has been 
demonstrated in section 27; to which I shall here add that a spirit has been 
shewn to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or 
ideas can exist; but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas 
should itself be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd. 
136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some have imagined) 
proper to know substances withal, which, if we had, we might know our 
own soul as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that, in case we had a new 
sense bestowed upon us, we could only receive thereby some new 
sensations or ideas of sense. But I believe nobody will say that what he 
means by the terms soul and substance is only some particular sort of idea or 
sensation. We may therefore infer that, all things duly considered, it is not 
more reasonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do not furnish 
us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance, than it would be if we 
should blame them for not being able to comprehend a round square. 
137. From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an 
idea or sensation have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much 
scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even probable that this opinion 
may have produced a doubt in some whether they had any soul at all distinct 
from their body since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it. 
That an idea which is inactive, and the existence whereof consists in being 
perceived, should be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, 
seems to need no other refutation than barely attending to what is meant by 
those words. But, perhaps you will say that though an idea cannot resemble 
a spirit in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some 
other respects; and it is not necessary that an idea or image be in all respects 
like the original. 
138. I answer, if it does not in those mentioned, it is impossible it should 
represent it in any other thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, 
thinking, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing else wherein the 
idea can be like a spirit. For, by the word spirit we mean only that which 
thinks, wills, and perceives; this, and this alone, constitutes the signification 
of the term. If therefore it is impossible that any degree of those powers 
should be represented in an idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit. 
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139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea signified by the terms 
soul, spirit, and substance, they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning 
in them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real thing, which is 
neither an idea nor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and wills, 
and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I denote by the term 
I, is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual substance. If it be said 
that this is only quarreling at a word, and that, since the immediately 
significations of other names are by common consent called ideas, no reason 
can be assigned why that which is signified by the name spirit or soul may 
not partake in the same appellation. I answer, all the unthinking objects of 
the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists 
only in being perceived; whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose 
existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and 
thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent equivocation and 
confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and unlike, that we distinguish 
between spirit and idea. See sect. 27. 
140. In a large sense, indeed, we may be said to have an idea or rather a 
notion of spirit; that is, we understand the meaning of the word, otherwise 
we could not affirm or deny anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the 
ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we 
suppose to be resemblances of them; so we know other spirits by means of 
our own soul- which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it having a 
like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me perceived has to 
those ideas perceived by another. 
141. It must not be supposed that they who assert the natural immortality of 
the soul are of opinion that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by 
the infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being, but only that it is 
not liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or 
motion. They indeed who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, 
or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body; 
since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being, which it is 
naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle wherein it is 
enclosed. And this notion has been greedily embraced and cherished by the 
worst part of mankind, as the most effectual antidote against all impressions 
of virtue and religion. But it has been made evident that bodies, of what 
frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind, which is more 
distant and heterogeneous from them than light is from darkness. We have 
shewn that the soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is 
consequently incorruptible. Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, 
changes, decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befall natural bodies 
(and which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly affect 
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an active, simple, uncompounded substance; such a being therefore is 
indissoluble by the force of nature; that is to say, "the soul of man is 
naturally immortal." 
142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that our souls are not to 
be known in the same manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of 
idea. Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when we say "they 
exist," "they are known," or the like, these words must not be thought to 
signify anything common to both natures. There is nothing alike or common 
in them: and to expect that by any multiplication or enlargement of our 
faculties we may be enabled to know a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as 
absurd as if we should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because I 
imagine it may be of moment towards clearing several important questions, 
and preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of the 
soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea of an active being, 
or of an action, although we may be said to have a notion of them. I have 
some knowledge or notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas, inasmuch as 
I know or understand what is meant by these words. What I know, that I 
have some notion of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be 
used convertibly, if the world will have it so; but yet it conduceth to 
clearness and propriety that we distinguish things very different by different 
names. It is also to be remarked that, all relations including an act of the 
mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of 
the relations and habitudes between things. But if, in the modern way, the 
word idea is extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an 
affair of verbal concern. 
143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine of abstract ideas has had no 
small share in rendering those sciences intricate and obscure which are 
particularly conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined they 
could frame abstract notions of the powers and acts of the mind, and 
consider them prescinded as well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their 
respective objects and effects. Hence a great number of dark and ambiguous 
terms, presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been introduced into 
metaphysics and morality, and from these have grown infinite distractions 
and disputes amongst the learned. 
144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards engaging men in 
controversies and mistakes with regard to the nature and operations of the 
mind, than the being used to speak of those things in terms borrowed from 
sensible ideas. For example, the will is termed the motion of the soul; this 
infuses a belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and 
determined by the objects of sense, as necessarily as that is by the stroke of 
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a racket. Hence arise endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence 
in morality. All which, I doubt not, may be cleared, and truth appear plain, 
uniform, and consistent, could but philosophers be prevailed on to retire into 
themselves, and attentively consider their own meaning. 
145. From what has been said, it is plain that we cannot know the existence 
of other spirits otherwise than by their operations, or the ideas by them 
excited in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and combinations of 
ideas, that inform me there are certain particular agents, like myself, which 
accompany them and concur in their production. Hence, the knowledge I 
have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas; but 
depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits 
distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant signs. 
146. But, though there be some things which convince us human agents are 
concerned in producing them; yet it is evident to every one that those things 
which are called the Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas 
or sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent on, the 
wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them; since it 
is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we 
attentively consider the constant regularity, order, and concatenation of 
natural things, the surprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection of the 
larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation, 
together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole, but 
above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the 
instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions of animals; I say if 
we consider all these things, and at the same time attend to the meaning and 
import of the attributes One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we 
shall clearly perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, "who works all 
in all," and "by whom all things consist." 
147. Hence, it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as 
any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves. We may even 
assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than the 
existence of men; because the effects of nature are infinitely more numerous 
and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one 
mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not more 
strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature. For, it is 
evident that in affecting other persons the will of man has no other object 
than barely the motion of the limbs of his body; but that such a motion 
should be attended by, or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends 
wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, "upholding all things 
by the word of His power," maintains that intercourse between spirits 
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whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other. And yet this 
pure and clear light which enlightens every one is itself invisible. 
148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they 
cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we 
should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we 
need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more 
full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I 
imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view; 
or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which 
represents them in the essence of God, which doctrine is, I must confess, to 
me incomprehensible. But I shall explain my meaning;- A human spirit or 
person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea; when therefore we 
see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain 
sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited to 
our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out unto us the 
existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain we do 
not see a man- if by man is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and 
thinks as we do- but only such a certain collection of ideas as directs us to 
think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, 
accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner we see 
God; all the difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow 
assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we 
direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens 
of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, 
being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very 
motions which are produced by men. 
149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is 
capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a Spirit who is 
intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas 
or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we have an absolute and 
entire dependence, in short "in whom we live, and move, and have our 
being." That the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious 
to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few, is a sad 
instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are 
surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Deity, are yet so little 
affected by them that they seem, as it were, blinded with excess of light. 
150. But you will say, Hath Nature no share in the production of natural 
things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of 
God? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or 
sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general 
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laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce 
anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as 
well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must 
confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning 
annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by 
those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite 
perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received 
among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly 
ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen 
philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord He causeth the 
vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings with rain; He bringeth forth the 
wind out of his treasures." Jerem. 10. 13. "He turneth the shadow of death 
into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night." Amos, 5. 8. "He 
visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing 
thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the pastures are 
clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn." See Psalm 
65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet 
we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns 
Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great 
distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead, 
though (if we may believe Saint Paul) "He be not far from every one of us." 
151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods 
observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their 
cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, 
untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, 
miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the 
whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a 
Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in 
a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being visible that the aforesaid 
methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most 
simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which 
argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial 
contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and 
various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole 
is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. "Verily" (saith the prophet) 
"thou art a God that hidest thyself." Isaiah, 45. 15. But, though the Lord 
conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at 
the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing 
can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, 
who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, 
from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to 
general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, 
and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass 
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of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of 
purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or 
powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly 
outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise. 
152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of 
nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of 
variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a 
picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would 
likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and 
embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come 
to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect 
of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. 
In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot 
procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we 
must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or 
vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production 
than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent 
Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of His will. 
Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be 
interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but 
rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power. 
153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant 
to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, 
in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-
being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of 
some one particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if 
we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and 
dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are 
affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the 
design with which we are put into the world; we shall be forced to 
acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, 
appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with 
the whole system of beings. 
154. From what has been said, it will be manifest to any considering person, 
that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of mind that 
there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be found. 
Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providence, 
the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the 
pains, to comprehend; but those who are masters of any justness and extent 
of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the 
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divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine throughout the Economy 
of Nature. But what truth is there which shineth so strongly on the mind that 
by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape 
seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of men, who are 
ever intent on business or pleasure, and little used to fix or open the eye of 
their mind, should not have all that conviction and evidence of the Being of 
God which might be expected in reasonable creatures? 
155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to neglect, 
than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an evident and 
momentous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of parts and 
leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through a supine and 
dreadful negligence, sunk into Atheism. Since it is downright impossible 
that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense of the 
omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit should persist in 
a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to 
meditate and dwell on those important points; that so we may attain 
conviction without all scruple "that the eyes of the Lord are in every place 
beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all 
places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment to put on"; that 
He is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts; and that we have a 
most absolute and immediate dependence on Him. A clear view of which 
great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspection 
and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to Virtue, and the best guard 
against Vice. 
156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is the 
consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main 
drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless and 
ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with a pious 
sense of the Presence of God; and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of 
those barren speculations which make the chief employment of learned men, 
the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary truths of the 
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